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Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical model exploring the effects of industrial policy
(IP) when entrepreneurs are characterized by different ability levels and sectors
are heterogeneous as for their profitability and social externalities generated. The
optimal structure of IP in terms of monetary transfers is shown to crucially depend
on the distribution of entrepreneurs abilities. Moreover, we find that IP increases
aggregate welfare under very general conditions, also in the presence of Government
failures. In an extension of the model, we consider the case in which the Government
can use also the provision of business training to entrepreneurs as an additional
instrument of IP. Based on these results, policy implication for industrial policy in
developing countries are discussed.
Keywords Industrial policy; entrepreneurs; heterogeneous abilities; training.
JEL classification: O25, O15, O14.
1 Introduction
The recent waves of economic crises have made evident the high vulnerability to external
shocks of developed and developing countries. Diversification of production and export
has been advocated as a possible strategy to build resilience to shocks. Yet, most of
developing countries are highly depended on agriculture and raw material sectors and
are experiencing a de-industrialization process (UNCTAD and UNIDO, 2011; Andreoni,
2015). As a reaction to this state of affair, there has been an increasing commitment of
Governments to support industrialization as part of a broader agenda to diversify the
economy through industrial policy (Chang et al., 2013).
Interestingly, this policy change has been accompanied by an increasing agreement
among scholars on the fact that - beside the creation of a competitive market environ-
ment - Governments of developing countries should also play a proactive role in facilitat-
ing structural transformation and industrial upgrading (Yu and Lin, 2015). Economic
development requires structural change from low to high productivity activities and the
manufacturing sector is a key engine of growth in the development process (Andreoni
and Gregory, 2013; Rodrik, 2014; Szirmai, 2012). As Ocampo and Ros (2011) point out,
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once the process of economic growth is seen as a process of structural change, industrial
policy becomes a central element of national development strategies.
While industrial policy (IP) is now back in both the political and the economic
discourse, this does not imply that it is all clear how to design an effective IP. In fact,
there are several factors that may make the effects of IP worse than the problems it
aims to solve. In this paper, we emphasize that one of the most relevant obstacle to
make IP successful is the mismatch between IP and the quality of the private sector and
of the government. In particular, we show how the characteristics of the private sector
have important - and not always obvious - implications for the efficacy of IP. The same
IP can have even opposite impact depending on the characteristics of the population of
entrepreneurs. Learning about the characteristics of the private sector is thus of utmost
importance to make IP effective.
To explore these issues, we develop a model whose assumptions have two character-
istics: 1) are able to capture those peculiar features of developing economies that are
likely to be relevant in determining the impact of IP in those countries and 2) provide a
simple setting to study this complex phenomenon.
We consider a two-sectors economy populated by agents heterogeneous in terms of
entrepreneurial abilities. The two sectors differ for the amount of knowledge diffused
among the entrepreneurs’ population about their specific production process. The already
active or known sector (e.g. agriculture, tourism etc.) is characterized by a high degree
of diffusion among entrepreneurs of the knowledge needed to operate its production
process. On the contrary, for the non-active or unknown sector (e.g. manufacturing)
the knowledge about the production tasks is not yet standardized and/or diffused in the
population. This cross-sectoral heterogeneity is reinforced in terms of sector profitability
and externality: while the already active or known sector provides a higher return for
private entrepreneurs than the other, the Government objective is to support the unknown
sector because it is assumed to produce a higher positive externality.
In this setting, IP is conceived as the set of selective government measures to influence
the structure of the economy in order to increase the share of the high social return
unknown sector (manufacturing) to maximize the aggregate welfare of the population.
We assume that IP is under the responsibility of the Industrial Policy Agency (IPA),
the country-specific governmental body which is in charge of the design, implementation
and monitoring of the national and sub-national industrial policy. We model IP in two
ways. The first one is a monetary transfer to entrepreneurs. This is sector specific
and independent from the individual productivity of the entrepreneur. The second is
instead the IPA increasing the economy-wide knowledge level about the production in the
unknown sector. This is achieved by providing local entrepreneurs entering the unknown
sector with training, market information, and logistic support to begin the activity and
reduce the costs associated with production and exporting in that sector.
This simple model structure allows us to derive a number of results. First, we show
that - as long as in the economy there is a positive level of knowledge concerning the
production technique of each sector, IP always increases welfare with respect to a neutral
policy, i.e. the one that provides the same incentives to both sectors. Second, our results
show that the structure of the sector incentives of the optimal IP largely depends on the
distribution of entrepreneurs abilities. In particular, the welfare gain effect of IP is larger
in economies where the level of knowledge about the production process in the unknown
sector is low (relatively to the average ability of the population) and the inequality in
the abilities’ distribution is high or, on the contrary, where the level of knowledge about
the unknown sector is high and inequality is low. Third, when we allow for Government
failures, we find that, while the larger the bias of the IPA the lower the welfare gain of
the IP with respect to the neutral policy, there always exists a non-empty set of values
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for the bias for which IP remains beneficial. It follows that there are configurations of
parameters for which IP increases welfare even in the presence of a corrupt and non-
benevolent Government. Fourth, when we expand the model to allow for IPA to use two
instruments, namely the monetary transfer and the support to entrepreneurs entering
the unknown sector, we find that the latter and the quality of entrepreneurs are in fact
substitutes: the higher is the ability of the private sector, the less needed are investments
to improve the capabilities of the IPA in coordinating or guiding the economic activity.
At the same time, the higher the inequality in the abilities the more important is the
role of the IPA.
Taken together these results support the view that the effectiveness of IP not only
depends on the characteristics of the specific IP measures adopted but also on the quality
of the entrepreneurs and on the capabilities of the government. It is thus essential to
learn about and take into proper account the heterogeneity in the entrepreneurs abilities
to identify the IP that would work better in each context.
Three main assumptions simplify our analysis. First, we abstract from the possibility
of international trade. It is well known that in the context of an open economy the
arguments in favour of IP are weaker. We will show that even in the more favorable closed-
economy case the conditions for the optimality of IP may be very stringent. Second,
we assume that the Government is benevolent and there is no corruption. Under these
assumptions, we are able to show that even excluding any political economy consideration
IP optimality is a non-obvious outcome that indeed greatly depends on the fit between
IP and the characteristics of the entrepreneurs. Finally, we abstract from local taxation
issues since we assume that IP is financed by an external donor. While this is indeed a
not too heroic assumption given that most of developing countries heavily rely on donors
to finance government programs to support domestic firms (also because of the well-
know difficulties to collect taxes), it also allows us to focus only on which is the optimal
structure of IP.
Our paper is related to different strands in the literature. The first is the large and
heterogeneous literature that argues that manufacturing and structural change matter for
economic growth and that sectors are different in terms of productivity and externalities
they generate (Andreoni and Gregory, 2013; Rodrik, 2014; Lin, 2013; Szirmai, 2012).
This heterogeneous body of research is relevant for our analysis to the extent to which
the unknown sector can be considered to be the manufacturing sector. We argue that
this is very likely in the context of developing countries where usually the largest share
of economic activity takes place in agricultural, service or natural resource sectors.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the role of government intervention and
in particular on the effects of industrial policy in developing countries. The empirical
literature on the effect of industrial policy has mostly focused on the analysis of the
Asian Tigers and the Latin American experiences (see Amsden, 1998; Chang, 1994;
Lall, 1996; Noland and Pack, 2002; Di Maio, 2009) while the number of studies on the
Sub-Saharan countries experiences with IP are much smaller (for a review see UNECA,
2011). Theoretical research has analysed the effect of IP on growth using a large variety
of different models and reaching almost any possible conclusion (Hausmann and Rodrik,
2003; Hodler, 2009; Hoff, 1994; Harrison and Rodrigues-Clare, 2010). In the literature,
IP has been modeled in different ways: targeted subsidies; monetary transfers to cover
the fixed costs of production; a regulatory policy forcing firms to remain in one specific
sector; a subsidy provided only to innovative firms (Bjorvatn and Coniglio, 2006; 2012;
Aghion et al., 2015; Hausman and Rodrik, 2003). With respect to this literature, our
model consider two types of IP (monetary transfer and improvement in IPA quality)
and it is the first one to explore the role of entrepreneur’s heterogeneous abilities in
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determining the optimal IP.1
Finally, our paper is close to the set of contributions looking at which policies would
favour most entrepreneurship and economic activity. In general, all policies directed to
influence entrepreneurs’ decisions can be considered as part of IP. There are few empiri-
cal papers looking at the micro-economic effects of those policies in developing countries.
While economic theory has long focused on mechanisms via which expanded access to
capital enables individuals to alter their occupational choices and improve their economic
conditions (Banerjee and Newman, 1993), there is an increasing attention to the need
to complement this with skill and information provision. Bandiera et al. (2013) empha-
size the importance of the process of occupational change and of programs which enable
poor people to upgrade occupations, rather than just make them more productive in a
given occupation. Lin (2012) argues that governments need to play a proactive role to
facilitate structural transformation and industrial upgrading by providing information to
entrepreneurs in the private sector on the the most dynamic industries. While there is
an increasing evidence on the disappointing performance of short-term training for exist-
ing micro-entrepreneurs (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2014), recent evaluations of business
training programs provide evidence of the existence of a complementarity between the
provision of capital and training (de Mel et al. 2012). Given the importance of both these
aspects, our IP actually uses both these instruments: it provides economic incentives in
the form of an individual cash transfer and provides support services for entrepreneurs
investing in a new sector.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present the basics of the model. In
section 3 we discuss the optimal IP when the government can use only one measures
(individual cash transfer). In Section 4, we extend the basic model allowing for possible
Government failures as well as considering the case in which the government can use an
additional measure (business training) as part of IP. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Basic structure
Consider a two-sectors economy populated by a continuum of individuals of mass M
with different innate abilities ai ∈ [0, 1]. Individuals (henceforth, the entrepreneurs) are
risk-neutral and self-employed in their small or medium size enterprises (SME’s). The
two sectors differ as for the amount of knowledge diffused among the population about
the sector-specific production processes. The already active or known sector (denoted by
“k”) is characterized by a high degree of diffusion among the population of entrepreneurs
of the knowledge needed to operate its production process. On the contrary, in the case
of the non-active or unknown sector (denoted by “u”) production knowledge is not yet
diffused and/or production tasks are not yet standardized.2
1Acs and Naude (2013) note that one of the reasons for IP failure is the “inappropriate emphasis on
stimulating economic activities and growth in a manner that was not optimal for entrepreneurship given
these countries’ levels of development”. In fact, there is considerable evidence that in countries where IP
has been more successful - such as the NIEs and China - IP was designed taking into proper account the
characteristics of the country’s entrepreneurs and their relation to the State. For instance, where the
entrepreneurial base was small and weak (Singapore and Korea), IP was at first aimed to complement and
strengthen the domestic entrepreneurial base, through allowing in much more foreign entrepreneurship
and by providing financial support to allow entrepreneurs to take on more risk in imitation and foreign
technology adoption. On the contrary, where the entrepreneurial base was fairly strong to begin with
(e.g. Taiwan and Japan), more limitations were placed on foreign entrepreneurs (Nelson and Pack, 1999).
2This formalization is meant to capture the situation - common to several developing countries -
in which entrepreneurs have often deep knowledge about the traditional sector (agriculture or often
also in the tourism and natural resources sectors) while there is a significant lack of expertise in the
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Return yij for project i in sector j is determined by sector-specific productivity pij
and by entrepreneurial skills eij of individual i operating in sector j = k, u, namely:
yij = pijeij . The level of entrepreneurial skills eij is a weighed average of the ability
of the entrepreneur, ai, and of the level of basic knowledge available in the economy
concerning the sector production process, bj > 0. The level of basic knowledge bj may
be determined by several factors, including government intervention, historical episodes,
geographical conditions or even chance. Both the ability of the entrepreneur and of the
level of basic knowledge concerning the sector production technology positively contribute
to the project return. However, their weight differ in each sector. While in the known
sector, project return hinges relatively more on the entrepreneur’s individual ability (since
the level of knowledge about the sector is already high and diffused), in the unknown
sector the project return depend more on the entrepreneur having the basic knowledge
about the production process (since entrepreneur’s ability is not very useful if the basics
are not known). Formally, yij = pijeij , where eij = θjai + (1 − θj)bj with j = u, k and
θk > θu. To simplify the exposition, we assume θk = 1 and θu = 0, i.e. that in the known
sector return only depends on the entrepreneurs’ ability, ai, while in the unknown what
matters is only the amount of basic knowledge available, b, in the economy which the
entrepreneur can access fully and at no cost.3
2.2 Industrial Policy
As we discussed in the Introduction, Industrial policy (IP) can be defined as the set
of selective government measures to modify the structure of the economy by increasing
the share of the manufacturing sector. IP can take different forms including subsidies,
tax concessions, soft loans, preferential procurement policies, import restrictions or ex-
port promotion measures. We assume that IP is under the responsibility of the Industrial
Policy Agency (IPA), the country-specific governmental body in charge of the design, im-
plementation and monitoring of the national and sub-national industrial policy (Hodler,
2011).4
In our model, IP takes two forms. The first one is a monetary transfer to en-
trepreneurs. This is sector specific and independent on the individual productivity of the
entrepreneur. The second is the IPA increasing the economy-wide knowledge level about
the production in the unknown sector. This is achieved by providing local entrepreneurs
entering the unknown sector with training, market information, and logistic support to
begin the activity and reduce the costs associated with production and exporting in that
sector.5 In this case, the level of basic knowledge concerning the production process in
the unknown sector, i.e. b, is a choice variables of the IPA maximization problem. To
simplify the exposition of the model, we begin by assuming that b is exogenously given.
In Section 4.2, we consider the case in which IPA uses both instruments and thus we
endogenize b in the budget constraint.
We assume that IPA has an exogenously given amount G of resources (e.g. provided
by an international donor development project) to be used to conduct IP (Hodler, 2011).
The total amount of resources G is fully utilized, so there is no saving by the IPA. The
individual transfer received by each entrepreneur in the known sector is τk and the total
amount at the sector level is:
Tk := Mητk
non-traditional sectors (in most of the cases manufacturing).
3In fact, the only necessary condition for all our results to hold true is that the basic knowledge
component is relatively more important in the unknown sector rather than in the known one.
4For a historical overview and empirical assessment of IPA activities and strategies in different coun-
tries see for instance Amsder, 2001; Cimoli et al. 2009; Naude et al. 2015.
5For instance, these are the activities usually performed by export promotion agencies in several
developing countries (Belloc and Di Maio, 2012).
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where η is the share of entrepreneurs investing in the known sector. The amount of
resources received by each entrepreneur in the unknown sector is τu and the total amount
is:
Tu := M(1− η)τu
where (1− η) is the share of entrepreneurs investing in the unknown sector.
When b is exogenous, IP is characterized by the couple (τk; τu). Hence the budget
constraint of the IPA is simply given by:
G = M(ητk + (1− η)τu) (1)
that rewritten in per-capita terms is:
g = ητk + (1− η)τu (2)
with g := G/M defined as the per-capita resources available for IP.
2.3 Entrepreneur sectoral allocation choice
As it follows from our assumptions (see Section 2.1), the entrepreneurial skill is eij = ai
if j = k, and eij = b if j = u. Hence, the profit associated with a project in the known
sector for entrepreneur i is:
pikai + τk
while the profit associated with a project in an unknown sector is:
piub+ τu
The entrepreneur chooses to invest in the known sector if and only if
ai ≥ a¯ := piub+ ∆τ
pik
. (3)
with ∆τ ≡ τu − τk. This condition gives the threshold ability level a¯ that identifies
entrepreneurs investing in the known sector: all those with an individual ability higher
than a¯ will have a higher (after the transfer) profit if they invest in the known sector.
The reverse holds for low ability individuals.
For any ai, we denote F (ai) as the share of entrepreneurs that have individual abil-
ity smaller or equal than ai. Formally, if f denotes the density of the share of the
entrepreneurs ability distribution, for any entrepreneurial skill a˜, we have:
F (a˜) =
∫ a˜
0
f(ai) dai. (4)
Using this notation, the share of entrepreneurs in the known and unknown sectors can
be, respectively, written as η =
∫ 1
a¯ f(ai)dai and (1 − η) =
∫ a¯
0 f(ai)dai. It follows that
the sector-level knowledge structure (in particular the level of knowledge in the unknown
sector b) plays a central role in determining the economy patter of specialization.
2.4 Aggregate welfare
Aggregate welfare is given by the sum of total sectoral returns, i.e. the social return of
each investment plus the transfer. We assume that investment in any of the two sectors
generates both a private return and a positive externality. Thus, the social return of each
investment Πj , with j = k, u, is given by
Πu = piu + U > piu and Πk = pik +K > pik (5)
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where U,K > 0 are the sector-specific externalities of the unknown and known sector,
respectively.6 Each investment in the known sector generates a total sectoral return equal
to
aiΠk + τk
i.e. the sum of the ability-weighted social return of the investment (individual return plus
the externality) and of the individual transfer received by the entrepreneur. It follows
that the total welfare generated by projects in the known sector is given by
M
(
Πk
∫ 1
a¯
aif(ai) dai +
∫ 1
a¯
τkf(ai) dai
)
The total return for each unknown project is, instead, given by
Πub+ τu
so that the total welfare generated by projects in the unknown sector is
M(Πub+ τu)
∫ a¯
0
f(ai)dai.
Finally, the net per capita aggregate welfare, defined as the average of all individual
returns and transfers, is
W
M
≡ ω = Πk
∫ 1
a¯
aif(ai) dai +
∫ 1
a¯
τkf(ai) dai + (Πub+ τu)
∫ a¯
0
f(ai)dai
= Πk
(∫ 1
a¯
aif(ai) dai
)
+ bΠu
∫ a¯
0
f(ai)dai + g (6)
Equation (6) makes clear that, in our model, IP influences aggregate welfare in two
ways. First, IP directly increases welfare because each individual receives a transfer g at
no cost. Second, IP indirectly affects welfare by modifying the allocation of entrepreneurs
among the two sectors. Note that, differently from other models, in our case IP does
not affect welfare by modifying sector productivities. This choice allows us to explore in
detail the role of IP as an instrument for creating the conditions for structural change
through the reallocation of individuals across different economic activities.
3 Results
We begin our analysis by deriving the optimal IP when the IPA is benevolent and has per-
fect information, i.e. there are no government failures. This implies that IPA knows the
true values of the sector-specific externalities.7 The analysis of the effect of government
failures on the characteristics of the optimal IP is presented in Section 4.1.
6Note that this simple formalization allows for the consideration of several different cases, including
that in which a sector with low individual productivity pij can generate high individual total returns
because of its high positive externality.
7The values of U and K employed by IPA in choosing IP can be the result of different processes,
ranging from being the outcome of a correct economic analysis, of a politically motivated decision (the
values are determined by the objective function of the Government) or of the activity of lobby groups
on the Government. In fact, as with any other form of government intervention, the effectiveness of IP
can be seriously impaired by the presence of different sources of government failure.
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3.1 Optimal Industrial Policy
The objective of IPA is to select the sectoral allocation of total resourcesG that maximizes
aggregate welfare. Thus, the IPA chooses τk and τu that maximize (6), by inducing the
optimal sectoral allocation of entrepreneurs which satisfies (3). Since the choice of τk
and τu impacts the welfare only through the value of a¯, i.e. the threshold ability level
that determines the sector allocation of entrepreneurs, we first find the optimal level of
a¯ by maximizing eq. (6). This is given by
a¯∗ =
Πub
Πk
. (7)
This is the ability value for which the return of the marginal entrepreneurs in the know
and unknown sector is equalized while individuals with ability greater (resp. smaller)
than a¯∗ invest in the known (resp. unknown) sector.
Using (3) and (5), the optimal allocation condition (7) can be rewritten as:
b
(
Upik −Kpiu
pik +K
)
= τu − τk (8)
The optimal IP is characterized by non-negative individual transfers τu and τk that
satisfy the budget constraint in eq. (1). There are three possible cases: 1) corner solution
with τu = 0; 2) corner solution with τk = 0; 3) internal solutions with both transfers
positive. The first two cases correspond to situations where the condition (8) cannot be
satisfied because - for given parameters - g is not large enough and, hence, the optimal
allocation of entrepreneurs described in (7) is not feasible.8 Focusing on the internal
solution case, we derive the following proposition:9
Proposition 3.1. The optimal τk and τu are the solutions of b
(
Upik−Kpiu
pik+K
)
= τu − τk
g = ητk + (1− η)τu =
[
1− F
(
Πub
Πk
)]
τk + F
(
Πub
Πk
)
τu
(9)
and (7) is satisfied so that
τu = g + [1− F (a¯∗)] b
(
Upik −Kpiu
pik +K
)
(10)
τk = g − F (a¯∗) b
(
Upik −Kpiu
pik +K
)
(11)
Proposition 3.1 shows that the optimal IP crucially depends on the value of the sector
externality as assumed by the Government. To focus on the most interesting case, we
assume that the positive externality generated by an investment in the unknown sector
is larger than that in the known sector, i.e. U > K.10 To make the analysis clearer, we
8It is possible to show that the IP induces the optimal allocation of entrepreneurs only under the
condition that a minimum level of transfers is available. Note that the larger is the value of g, the larger
is the possibility for the IPA to induce a reallocation of entrepreneurs. Yet, for g larger than a certain
critical value g¯, entrepreneurs’ choices are unaffected, so that the marginal entrepreneur has ability equal
to a¯∗ in eq. (7). It follows that the value of g¯ divides the corner solutions cases and the internal solutions
ones.
9The full characterization of the optimal IP for the different cases is derived in Appendix A, see in
particular Proposition A.1.
10Note that this is the configuration for which a-priori IP may appear less controversial. By showing
that also in this case optimal IP largely depends on the distribution of entrepreneurs abilities strengthen
our argument.
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assume U > 0 and K = 0. Under these assumptions, the optimal IP is characterized by
the individual transfers
τu = g + [1− F (a¯∗)] bU, (12)
τk = g − F (a¯∗)bU, (13)
while the optimal amounts of resources transferred to each sector are
Tu = M(1− η)τu = MF (a¯∗) (g + (1− F (a¯∗))bU) (14)
Tk = Mητk = M(1− F (a¯∗)) (g − F (a¯∗)bU) (15)
It can be easily verified that, for K = 0, the minimum level of per-capita resources g¯,
which guarantees that the optimal allocation of entrepreneurs a¯∗ is feasible, is given by:
g¯ := F
(
Πub
Πk
)
bU. (16)
Aggregate Welfare The IP affects aggregate welfare through two channels. On one
side, IP increases aggregate welfare by providing monetary transfers to all entrepreneurs.
On the other side, IP impacts on aggregate welfare by providing (asymmetric) incentives
at the sector level to influence the size and the ability composition of the group of
entrepreneurs operating in the two sectors.
To disentangle the two phenomena, we define as benchmark the aggregate welfare
when the IPA chooses the neutral policy τu = τk = g.11 It is easy to show that:
Proposition 3.2. For any b > 0, the aggregate welfare under optimal IP is always
strictly larger than under the neutral policy.
As long as the level of basic knowledge in the unknown sector is not zero, the neutral
policy (same transfer to both sector) does never satisfies the optimality conditions (12)
and (13), and hence it is always suboptimal. This result implies that the optimal IP
does not necessarily need to target only sectors characterized by dynamic comparative
advantage á la Redding (1999). In our setting, indeed, the welfare increasing effect of
IP follows specifically from the fact that IP induces low-ability entrepreneurs to invest
in the unknown sector.12
3.2 Optimal IP and distribution of entrepreneurs’ abilities
In order to characterize in detail the link between the optimal IP and the characteristics
of the economy, in the following we explore how the former changes with the distribution
of entrepreneurs’ abilities. More precisely in this section, we analyze how optimal IP
changes with differences in the: 1) average population ability and; 2) inequality in the
ability distribution (for given average ability level of the population of entrepreneurs).
11Observe that such a policy is admissible (the contribution to each entrepreneur is g and the total
cost of the intervention is G = Mg) and non-distortionary (entrepreneur i chooses to invest in a project
in the known sector if and only if ai ≥ (piub+ ∆τ) /pik where ∆τ ≡ τu − τk = 0, which is equivalent to
aipik ≥ piub, i.e. the condition to invest in a project in the known sector in absence of IPA intervention).
12Those are all individuals with entrepreneurial ability smaller than the level of the basic knowledge
in the unknown sector (ai < b), implying that for them it always holds yu > yi.
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Comparing populations of entrepreneurs with different average ability levels
We consider a family of cumulative distributions of entrepreneurs’ abilities Fγ indexed
by a real parameter γ. We assume that the distributions are “ordered” in the sense that
Fγ(a¯
∗) is decreasing in γ. This is the case, for instance, if Fγ are ordered in the sense
of stochastic dominance. We denote with ηγ the share of entrepreneurs investing in the
known sector when the distribution of ability is induced by Fγ . We have the following
results:
Lemma 3.3. Under the optimal IP, ηγ is increasing in γ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.4. The optimal individual and sectoral transfers are characterised as
follows:
(i) If g ≥ Fγ
(
Πub
Πk
)
bU , individual transfers τk and τu are increasing in γ; also, Tk
(Tu) is increasing (decreasing) in γ.
(ii) If g ≤ Fγ
(
Πub
Πk
)
bU , τu = g
F
(
Πub
Πk
) and Tu = g, while τk = Tk = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.4 illustrates how - when IPA has enough resources (case i) - the optimal
IP changes with the average level of ability in the entrepreneurs’ population. If the ability
level of the population is low, it is optimal for the IPA to support relatively more the
entrepreneurs in the unknown sector (the lower γ the higher Tu). On the contrary, for
high levels of average ability, the optimal IP is characterized by more resources transferred
to the known sector. It follows that - ceteris paribus - the optimal structure of the IP
incentives depends on the average ability level of the entrepreneurs’ population.
While IP is always welfare improving as long as b > 0 (see Proposition 3.2), it is
important to evaluate how this effect changes with the ability level in the population. To
analyze how the welfare gain of the optimal IP varies with respect to the benchmark case
(i.e. neutral policy) as a function of γ, we define the gain in the aggregate per-capita
welfare generated by the optimal IP, as following:
ωR =
ω∗
ωn
− 1 (17)
where, using eq. (6), ω∗ = ω(a¯∗) is the welfare under the optimal IP (i.e., evaluated
at a¯∗), while ωn = ω(a¯n) is the welfare under the neutral policy, (i.e., evaluated at
a¯n = piub/pik).
To numerically solve the model, we consider a family of cumulative abilities Fγ(a) =
aγ for γ ∈ [0, 1], with larger γs associated with higher abilities (in the sense of first order
dominance).13 Figure 1 shows the relation between ωR and γ for different distributions
of abilities. For small γ’s, the welfare effect of the optimal IP is always increasing in the
population abilities. To understand why, we first note from eq. (6) that the IP has two
opposite effects on welfare. On a side, the higher the number of entrepreneurs in the
unknown sector (i.e., the lower is γ), the larger the positive welfare effect of supporting
them (size effect). On the other side, the optimal IP - providing a higher transfer to
entrepreneurs in the unknown sector - has a negative effect on welfare since it induces
some high ability individuals to divert their investment from the known (high produc-
tivity) sector to the unknown (low productivity) one (productivity effect). Starting from
13This functional form generates in a simple way a positive correlation between average ability of the
population and individual returns (see Section 2.1).
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small γ, the size effect is greater than the productivity one. As γ increases, there exists a
threshold ability level beyond which the productivity and the number of entrepreneurs in
the known sector become large enough that supporting relatively more the entrepreneurs
in the unknown sector does not relatively increase welfare: after this point, the welfare
gain of IP is smaller the larger the γ.
Figure 1: Relative welfare difference (ωR): optimal IP vs benchmark
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Parameters: pik = Πk = 1.5, piu = 1, U = 1, b = 0.1, g = 2.
Summarizing, the welfare gain effect of IP is larger for economies with entrepreneurs
with intermediate level abilities: the allocation induced by the optimal IP and the bench-
mark one are the most different. On the contrary, for very small or large values of γ, the
optimal and benchmark allocation are more similar and the welfare gain of IP is small.
Comparing population of entrepreneurs characterized by different inequality
levels in the ability distribution We now compare the optimal IP for populations
of entrepreneurs characterized by different inequality levels in the abilities’ distribution,
while holding constant the average ability. Due to the analytical complexity of this
comparison, we consider the following specific family of cumulative distribution function:
Fα(a) = a+ αφ(a) (18)
where φ(a) is the function
φ(a) = a(a− 1/2)(a− 1). (19)
While for any value of α the average value of the ability in the population is always 1/2,
the larger is α the higher is the inequality in the abilities’ distribution.14
Using eqs. (18) and (19), we start noticing that:
∂Fα(a¯
∗)
∂α
R 0 if and only if a¯∗ Q 1
2
(20)
Condition (20) indicates that for an economy in which the ability of the marginal en-
trepreneur (a¯∗, see eq. 7) is lower (resp., higher) than the average ability level of pop-
14This functional form of the cumulative distribution function (18) connects, in a simple way, the
mean preserving spread of the distribution to one parameter only (i.e., α). The distribution is ordered
in the sense of second order stochastic dominance (e.g., Lorenz dominance). The choice of the mean at
1/2 is a simplifying assumption which does not qualitatively affect the results.
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ulation, a higher inequality is associated with a larger (resp., smaller) number of en-
trepreneurs investing in the unknown sector.15
The implications of this mechanism for the structure of optimal IP for different levels
of inequality in the distribution of entrepreneurs’ abilities are illustrated in Figure 2.
Numerical results show that the relation between the optimal individual transfer and
the distribution of entrepreneurial ability depends on the knowledge structure of the
economy. In economies where the level of basic knowledge b is low enough such that the
ability of the marginal entrepreneur is lower than the average ability in the population
(i.e. a¯∗ < 1/2), the higher is the inequality the smaller is the optimal individual transfer
to entrepreneurs in the unknown sector (τu). On the contrary, if the economy has a level
of b high enough such that a¯∗ > 1/2, the higher the inequality the higher the optimal
transfer τu.
Figure 2: Optimal individual transfer to the unknown sector (τu) and inequality (α): low
and high ability of the marginal entrepreneur (a¯∗)
Parameters: pik = Πk = 1.5, piu = 1, U = 1, g = 2;
a¯∗ < 1/2 (b = 0.2), a¯∗ > 1/2 (b = 0.6).
As it directly follows from eqs. (12)-(13) and (20), if a¯∗ < 1/2, a higher inequality
implies a higher share of entrepreneurs working in the unknown sector, and thus a lower
amount of resources that can be transferred to each of them.16 At the same time, a
higher inequality corresponds to a higher minimal level of resources necessary to induce
the optimal allocation of entrepreneurs (see 16). The vice-versa holds for a¯∗ > 1/2.
Hence, depending on the level of basic knowledge in the unknown sector (which is a
crucial determinant of a¯∗), inequality in the abilities’ distribution may generate either
an additional cost or a bonus for the optimal IP, with higher inequality resulting more
costly for economies with low levels of basic knowledge.
This mechanism becomes even clearer if we analyze in another way the role of in-
equality by comparing two economies with same abilities’ distributions but different levels
of basic knowledge in the unknown sector. As it follows from eqs. (12)-(13), a higher
level of b has two opposite effects. On the one hand, through its effect on the ability of
marginal entrepreneur (a¯∗), a higher b is indirectly associated with a higher number of
15This directly follows from the fact that an increase in the spread makes the tails of abilities distri-
bution fatter.
16Recall that the unknown sector is always more costly for IPA than the known sector and that the
difference τu − τk does not depend on α (see eq. 9).
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entrepreneurs working in the unknown sector and thus with a lower per-capita transfer τu
(the same size effect described above). On the other hand, a higher b also increases the
productivity of each entrepreneur in the unknown sector (productivity effect), pushing the
differential τu − τk (eq. 9), by directly increasing (resp., reducing) the level of τu (resp.,
τk). Greater inequality tends to amplify the size effect, and then the cost associated with
a larger number of entrepreneurs in the unknown sector. For sufficiently low levels of
inequality the size effect is lower than the productivity one, so that economies with low
levels of basic knowledge in the unknown sector can support higher optimal individual
transfers than economies with high levels of basic knowledge can do. On the contrary, for
sufficiently high levels of inequality, the relation is reversed: economies with low levels of
basic knowledge in the unknown sector show smaller individual transfers than economies
with high levels of basic knowledge.
Together, these opposite results demonstrate once again how sensitive the optimal
IP is to the actual distribution of abilities in the population of entrepreneurs and, as a
consequence, how diverse can be the impact of a given IP on aggregate welfare depending
on the inequality in the ability levels and on the knowledge structure of the economy.
Specifically, Figure 3 illustrates that the welfare gain (ωR) induced by the optimal IP
(relatively to the neutral policy) is either larger or smaller in the level of inequality α
depending on whether a¯∗ < 1/2 or a¯∗ > 1/2.
Figure 3: Relative welfare difference and inequality: low and high ability of the marginal
entrepreneur
Parameters: pik = Πk = 1.5, piu = 1, U = 1, g = 2;
a¯∗ < 1/2 (b = 0.2), a¯∗ > 1/2 (b = 0.6).
When the level of basic knowledge is high, the ability of the marginal entrepreneur
is higher than the average ability of the population (a¯∗ > 1/2). In this case, a large
share of entrepreneurs are active in the unknown sector, while only the highest ability
individuals invest in the known sector. In this environment, the IP, which is characterized
by an asymmetric treatment of entrepreneurs (τu > τk), has a larger effects on aggregate
welfare than the neutral policy (τu = τk). However, the higher the inequality, the smaller
the number of entrepreneurs in the unknown sector (eq. 20), and then the smaller the
effect of IP on aggregate welfare. In this case, the welfare gain of the optimal IP decreases
with inequality. When the level of basic knowledge is low (i.e., a¯∗ < 1/2), the effects are
reversed. A large part of the entrepreneurs invest in the known sector, while only few
choose the unknown one: this implies that the IP generates only small gains on aggregate
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welfare with respect to a neutral policy. Yet, the higher the inequality, the higher the
fraction of entrepreneurs in the unknown sector (eq. 20), and then the larger becomes
the role of the optimal IP in sustaining aggregate welfare. Hence, in this case, the welfare
gains of the optimal IP increases with inequality.
This mechanism suggests that IP plays a more important role in countries where
either the level of basic knowledge concerning the unknown sector is high and inequality
in the entrepreneur’s ability distribution is low, or, on the contrary, where the level of
basic knowledge in low and inequality is high. To understand why, note that IP impacts
aggregate welfare only through its effect on the marginal entrepreneurs:17 IP increases
aggregate welfare by inducing them to change sector of activity. The other entrepreneurs
instead never change the sector they invest into.18 Since the higher welfare gain is
generated by the reallocation of entrepreneurs with lower abilities among those in the
interval [b(piu/pik), b(Πu/Πk)]19, the effectiveness of the IP on aggregate welfare depends
on the population size in that interval. The findings in Figure 3 can then be rationalized
noticing that a higher level of b enlarges this interval via the productivity effect. At the
same time, when a¯∗ > 1/2 (resp., a¯∗ < 1/2) a higher inequality tends to reduce (resp.,
increase) the mass of entrepreneurs in the interval through the size effect.
Overall, these results reinforce our previous conclusions: the impact of IP on the
economy crucially depends on the distribution of entrepreneurs abilities. This means
that the characteristics of the optimal IP vary with the current economic conditions.
Hence, in order to correctly predict its effects and to minimize unintended negative
consequences, a proper understanding of the characteristics of the economic environment
- and in particular of the private sector - is a necessary condition for the design of any
IP.
4 Robustness and extensions
Until now, we have assumed that the Government is benevolent, it has perfect infor-
mation, and it has no control over the amount of knowledge concerning the production
process in the unknown sector - we have assumed that b is exogenously given. In the
followings, we relax these assumptions, showing: 1) the robustness of the basic setup to
possible IPA’s errors in evaluating the true externality of the economic sectors; 2) that,
when the Government can influence the level of basic knowledge in the unknown sector,
further insights emerge on the effect of IP for the aggregate welfare.
4.1 Optimal IP and Government bias
We first introduce the possibility that a bias affects the Government choice of the optimal
IP. This bias can be interpreted - among other possibilities - as a measure of the level of
corruption or of imperfect information on the Government side. In particular, we study
the effect of a bias in the IPA evaluation of the magnitude of the externality generated
in the unknown sector. We assume that while the true value of the unknown sector
externality is Uˆ , the IPA chooses the IP under the expectation that the externality is
U = Uˆ(1 − z), with z ∈ [−1, 1]; hence, the lower (resp., higher) the value of z with
respect to 0, the more IPA overestimates (resp., underestimates) the true value of the
externality.
17These are the entrepreneurs with ability ai in the interval (a¯n, a¯∗).
18These are the entrepreneurs with with ai < a¯n or ai > a¯∗. Despite IPA intervention, entrepreneurs
with ai < a¯n remain in the unknown sector, while those with ai > a¯∗ always stay in the known one.
19Remember that a¯n = b(piu/pik) is the ability of the marginal entrepreneur under the neutral policy
τu = τk, while a¯∗ = b(Πu/Πk) is the threshold ability of the marginal entrepreneur under the optimal
IP (eq. 7).
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Since the externality produced by the unknown sector can now be smaller than that
generated by the known one, we need to abandon the simplifying assumptions we have
employed so far, U > K = 0 (see Section 3.1). This implies that the relationship between
the optimal τu and τk depends on both sector externalities and individual productivities
(see eq. 8). In particular τu R τk, as long as:20
U R piu
pik
K (21)
In the presence of Government bias, condition (21) becomes:
U = Uˆ(1− z) R piu
pik
K (22)
To analyze the effects of the IPA bias on aggregate welfare, we compare the aggregate
welfare under the optimal IP for different levels of z, and the aggregate welfare in the
benchmark case (neutral policy). We define this relative difference as:
ωE =
ωB
ωn
− 1 (23)
with ωB = ω(a¯B), where a¯B is the socially optimal allocation of entrepreneurs as defined
in eq. (7) under the bias z.
Figure 4 plots ωE as function of the bias z. Not surprisingly, the larger the bias
(either positive or negative) of the IPA the lower the welfare gain of the optimal IP
with respect to the neutral policy. More interestingly, the numerical results indicate that
there is a non-empty set of values of the bias for which IP is still optimal: there exist
configurations of parameters for which IP is optimal even in the presence of a corrupt and
non-benevolent Government. Finally, note that the effect of the bias is not symmetric.
In particular, underestimating the true value of the externality reduces the welfare gain
of IP less than overestimating it. This suggests a conservative approach in estimating the
magnitude of the positive externalities generated by investments in the unknown sector
as to minimize the possible negative welfare effects of IP in the presence of Government
bias.
20Condition (21) indicates that it is optimal for the IPA to support relatively more the entrepreneurs
in the unknown sector under the condition that U is greater than the weighed K, where the weight is
given by the sector-specific relative productivities piu/pik. Note that the condition is also satisfied when
U < K if pik is sufficiently higher than piu, pik >> piu. This implies that the condition U > K is not
necessary to have the Government optimally providing support to the unknown sector.
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Figure 4: Relative welfare difference under optimal IP and neutral policy (ωE) for dif-
ferent level of government bias (z)
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Parameters: pik = 1.5, piu = 1, U = 1, K = 0.5, b = 0.2, γ = 0.7, g = 2.
4.2 Endogenous sector knowledge level, IPA quality and the effective-
ness of Industrial Policy
Until now, we have assumed that the return for investment projects in the unknown sec-
tor yu is equal for all entrepreneurs, positive and exogenously given since it only depends
on the sector-level productivity piu and on the current level of knowledge concerning the
production techniques in the unknown sector available in the economy b. However, the
level of b - rather than being exogenous - may more realistically depend on a series of in-
dustrial policy measures implemented by the IPA. For instance, it may be determined by
the quantity of training provided by the IPA to local entrepreneurs planning to invest in
the unknown sector; by the quality of the information on markets opportunities provided
by the Government to entrepreneurs, etc. It follows that the costs of these activities
have to be more realistically included in the IPA budget constraint together with the
monetary transfers. Thus, differently from the exogenous case, b is now a choice variable
in the Government optimization problem: this implies that the return for the projects in
the unknown sector depends on the Government investments to improve the IPA quality.
In this sense, b can be interpreted as a proxy for the quality and the capability level of
the IPA itself: the higher the ability of the IPA, the higher b, and thus the higher the
return from investing in the unknown sector.
In the following, we assume that the cost of achieving a targeted level of b is repre-
sented by a specific functional form given by:21
c(b) =
1
2
Λb2 (24)
for some positive constant Λ, representing a technological shift that governs the relevance
of the cost function. The IPA budget constraint becomes
g = c(b) + ητk + (1− η)τu, (25)
and the IP becomes defined by the triple (τk, τu, b), among those satisfying the budget
constraint. Given c(b), the sectoral allocation of the entrepreneurs follows the same
21In the main text, we highlight only the main features of the modeling strategy. All the mathematical
details are included in the Appendix B.
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structure described in Section 2.3: entrepreneurs choose to invest in the unknown sector
if and only if the profit is higher than the profit of investing in the known sector (see eq.
(3)).22 Finally, the per-capita welfare function can be rewritten as:
ω = Πk
∫ 1
a¯
aif(ai) dai +
∫ 1
a¯
τkf(ai) dai + (Πub+ τu)
∫ a¯
0
f(ai)dai − c(b)
= Πk
(∫ 1
a¯
aif(ai) dai
)
+ bΠu
∫ a¯
0
f(ai)dai + g − c(b) (26)
As in the case of exogenous b, in the following we compare the social optimal allocation
chosen by the IPA with a benchmark. In this context, to be consistent with our previous
analysis, we consider as a benchmark a situation where the level of b is exogenously fixed
and τu = τk =
G−c(b)
M . It is immediate to show that Proposition 3.2 holds also in this
new setting (see Proposition B.1).
4.2.1 IP and entrepreneurs’ quality
IP, welfare and average ability As in the exogenous case, the characteristics of the
optimal IP depend on the average entrepreneurs’ abilities (Figure 5). The numerical
results in Panel 5a shows that, if we choose the same cumulative distributions Fγ as
in Section 3.2, b (the optimal level of IPA quality chosen by the Government) and a¯∗
(the ability of the marginal entrepreneur under the optimal IP) are both decreasing
functions of γ (the average level of abilities in the entrepreneurs population). These
results complement those derived in Section 3.2: a higher average ability in the population
is optimally associated with larger transfers to support projects in the known sector
(Panel 5b) and with smaller investment to support IPA activities. This can be interpreted
as suggesting that the ability level of entrepreneurs and that of the IPA are in fact
substitutes: the higher is the ability of the private sector, the less useful are investments
to improve the capabilities of the IPA in coordinating or guiding the economic activity.
Figure 5: Optimal IPA quality (b), share of entrepreneurs in the unknown sector (a¯∗)
and individual sector-specific transfers as function of the entrepreneurs’ average ability
(γ)
(a) b and a¯∗
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Parameters: pik = Πk = 1.5, piu = 1, U = 1, g = 2, Λ = 4
22The only difference is that now b in equation (3) is a choice variable for the Government.
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Moreover, Panel 5b shows that, differently from the exogenous case, now the difference
between τk and τu is not longer constant across entrepreneur’s average ability levels,23
and the value of τu is not necessarily monotonic.24
Finally, similarly to the exogenous case, the effect of the optimal IP is always welfare
increasing and its effectiveness depends on γ. The mechanics is the same as for Figure
1: the effect of IP is small for very low and very high levels of average ability because
in these cases the entrepreneur’s individual choice in the benchmark is similar to that
under the optimal IP. In the case of endogenous IPA quality, this effect is even stronger
because for higher levels of γ the optimal level of b is lower.
IP, welfare and inequality levels in the ability distribution To analyze how
abilities’ distributions characterized by different inequality levels affect the optimal level
of IPA quality, the optimal share of entrepreneurs in the unknown sector, and aggregate
welfare, we consider the same family of cumulative distribution described in section 3.2
(eqs. 18-19).
Numerical solutions of the model are illustrated in Figures 6 and 7.25 Panel 6a indi-
cates that the higher is the inequality in the abilities’ distribution (higher α), the higher
are both the optimal level of IPA quality (b) and the ability of the marginal entrepreneur
(a¯∗). Indeed, the higher the inequality, the larger the share of the population with very
low ability, and thus the higher the potential gain that can be achieved by training and
employing them in the unknown sector. Again, this suggests that the IPA intervention is
particularly important in economies characterized by higher abilities’ inequality: even if
costly, the activity of the IPA is optimal because it allows the identification and support
of projects in the unknown sector in a situation in which the entrepreneurs’ abilities are
particularity weak.
As shown in Panel 6b, this mechanism affects also the individual monetary resources
that the IPA can optimally transfer to the entrepreneurs. Increases in the spread of the
abilities’ distribution induces the IPA to invest more to improve the quality of services
provided (as measured by b), which, as a consequence, partially crowds out the individual
transfers. Hence, both the individual transfers tends to decrease when the level of the
inequality increases, indicating that the higher the inequality, the stronger the incentives
23In the exogenous setting (eq. 9), the difference in the individual transfers for the entrepreneurs in the
two sectors τu−τk is constant and determined only by exogenously fixed parameters (i.e., b, U,K, pik, piu).
It follows that, whatever the ability level, also the difference between the optimal individual incentives
is fixed.
24We have that
τu = Ω− 1
2
Λb2 +
(
1− F
(
Πub
Πk
))
bU.
with b being the optimal level of IPA quality, as represented in Figure 5a. The term 1
2
Λb2 is the cost of
maintaining the IPA structure: the higher the cost to maintain the IPA the less the resources available
to be transferred to entrepreneurs investing in the projects in unknown sector (and in the known sector
as well, since the same term appears also in the expression of τk). The term
(
1− F
(
Πub
Πk
))
bU instead
represents the value of the “missed externalities”. It is given by the product between
(
1− F
(
Πub
Πk
))
(which is the number of projects activated in the known sector, i.e. the sector without positive exter-
nality), U (which is the intensity of the externality) and b. In other words, this is the value the projects
activated in the known sector would have had if they had been activated in a unknown sector. While
the behavior of the cost 1
2
Λb2 is monotonic in γ (we have already observed that b always decreases when
γ increases), the behavior of the missed externalities is not monotonic. Indeed the optimal number of
projects in the known sector
(
1− F
(
Πub
Πk
))
increases with the ability level of the population while the
optimal quality b of the IPA structure decreases. Panel 5b shows that the first effect is stronger for small
values of γ while the second is stronger for γ large enough. This non-monotonic behavior of the missed
externalities causes the non-monotonic behavior of τu.
25Mathematical details are sketched in the Appendix B.
18
Figure 6: Optimal IPA quality (b), productivity of the marginal entrepreneur (a¯∗) and
optimal transfers as function of of the distribution of entrepreneurs’ ability (α)
(a) b and a¯∗
 1.75
 1.8
 1.85
 1.9
 1.95
 2
 2.05
 2.1
 1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4
Tr
an
sf
er
Inequality (α)
τk
τu
(b) Individual transfers
Parameters: pik = Πk = 1.5, piu = 1, U = 1, g = 2, Λ = 4
of the IPA to substitute improvements in quality of services for higher individual trans-
fers. However one can observe that, consistently with the described behavior of b, the
net incentive τu − τk to switch to the unknown sector increases when α increases and
that the individual transfers to entrepreneurs in the unknown sector are not necessarily
monotonic, increasing for very low levels of inequality and decreasing only for high lev-
els of inequality. This latter effect depends on the quality of the support that the IPA
can offer to entrepreneurs investing in the unknown sector. When the inequality in the
ability of the entrepreneurs is very low, it is optimal for the IPA to invest less in the
quality of services provided (i.e. choosing a low b). As a consequences, for low levels of
inequality, the IPA substitutes monetary transfers for the provision of services to sustain
the activity of the unknown sector entrepreneurs: this implies that individual transfers
to entrepreneurs in the unknown sector are larger. On the contrary, when the quality of
the IPA (b) is large enough, the resource constraint makes it optimal for IPA to reduce
the individual transfer to entrepreneurs in the unknown sector.
Finally, results reported in Figure 7 show that the welfare gain associated with the
optimal IP is non-monotonic in the levels of inequality in the ability distribution. This is
due to two different effects of the IP. On one hand, there is the same mechanism described
in Figure 1: the higher the polarization the more similar the individual and the optimal
social choice. This implies that the effectiveness of the IP is smaller for higher values of
inequality. On the other hand, the higher the inequality the higher the optimal level of
training and services provided by IPA (as measured by b) and then the larger the benefit
of re-allocating workers. Hence, IP turns to be most effective when inequality is either
very small or very high.
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Figure 7: Welfare gain under the optimal IP for different levels of inequality in the ability
distribution (α).
Parameters: pik = Πk = 1.5, piu = 1, U = 1, g = 2, Λ = 4.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have provided a simple model to analyse the effects of IP on aggregate
welfare. The setting of the model is able to capture some of the peculiar features of most
developing economies and allows us to derive a number of results. In particular, we have
shown how the optimal IP changes with the ability distribution of the entrepreneurs’
population and the Government bias.
Our results support the view that that there is not a one-for-all optimal IP but
rather there is an IP that is more likely to be most effective given a certain distribution
of abilities among entrepreneurs in any specific historical moment. In fact, our results
show that the same intervention (a simple cash transfer) may have very different (even
opposite) effects depending on the distribution of entrepreneurs capabilities.
These results also shed some lights on the reasons for the very different effects that
the various development strategies implemented in the last four decades (i.e. inward-
industrialization strategy, structural adjustment programs, etc.) had in different coun-
tries. While we do not discuss why these waves of development strategies are adopted
in developing countries (on this see Hodler, 2011), we argue that these strategies cannot
be said to be wrong or correct in abstract since the effects of Government intervention
(or lack thereof) ultimately depends on the distribution of entrepreneurs abilities and
Government quality. Our results thus suggest that there is no much sense in trying to
identify the best development strategy and make developing countries to adopt that, as
it is still too much common in development advocacy. In fact, Government interventions
that have been historically effective (for instance in the form of Industrial Policy) had a
strong country-specific component and had been shaped according to the characteristics
of the entrepreneurial class and government capabilities and on how they historically
evolved creating the current economy context. We leave the exploration of these propo-
sitions for further research.
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Appendices
A Proofs and technicalities for Section 3
The following more general version of Proposition 3.1, that also takes into account the corner
solutions case, can be obtained using a standard maximization procedure.
Proposition A.1. The optimal IP is characterized by non-negative individual transfers τu and τk
that satisfy the budget constraint in eq. (1). The optimal individual transfers can be characterized
as follows:
(i) If
(
Upik−Kpiu
pik+K
)
∈
(
− g(
1−F
(
Πub
Πk
))
b
, g
F
(
Πub
Πk
)
b
)
then the optimal τk and τu are
τu = g + (1− F (a¯∗)) b
(
Upik −Kpiu
pik +K
)
(A.1)
τk = g − F (a¯∗) b
(
Upik −Kpiu
pik +K
)
(A.2)
(ii) If
(
Upik−Kpiu
pik+K
)
≤ − g(
1−F
(
Πub
Πk
))
b
, then the optimal τk and τu are
τu = 0 (A.3)
τk = g + F
(
Πub
Πk
)
g(
1− F
(
Πub
Πk
)) = g(
1− F
(
Πub
Πk
)) (A.4)
(iii) If
(
Upik−Kpiu
pik+K
)
≥ g
F
(
Πub
Πk
)
b
, then the optimal τk and τu are
τu = g +
(
1− F
(
Πub
Πk
))
g
F
(
Πub
Πk
) = g
F
(
Πub
Πk
) (A.5)
τk = 0. (A.6)
Proof of Lemma 3.3. We have that F1(a¯∗) = F1
(
Πub
Πk
)
≥ F2
(
Πub
Πk
)
= F2(a¯
∗) so η1 = 1 −
F1(a¯
∗) ≤ 1− F2(a¯∗) = η2.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. From equations (12), (13) and (15) it derives that a decrease in the
proportion of entrepreneurs in the unknown sector F (a¯∗), induced by an increase in the average
ability γ, implies an increase of τu, τk and Tk. Hence, from the budget constraint (1), Tu decreases
correspondingly. Part (ii) describes just the corner solution case.
B Proofs and details for Section 4.2
The objective of this section is to formally characterize the optimal IP when the IPA may use
- in addition to individual transfer - also an additional set of costly non-monetary instruments,
represented by the level of b.
Define c(b) the function (increasing in b and with c(0) = 0) that describes the per-capita cost
for the IPA to generate a level of basic knowledge in the unknown sector b for the projects in the
unknown sector. Later c(b) will be specified as in Section 4.2. As already observed in Section
4.2, in this case the (per-capita) IP budget constraint becomes:
g = c(b) + ητk + (1− η)τu. (B.1)
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and the per-capita welfare function is:
ω = Πk
∫ 1
a¯
aif(ai) dai +
∫ 1
a¯
τkf(ai) dai + (Πub+ τu)
∫ a¯
0
f(ai)dai − c(b)
= Πk
(∫ 1
a¯
aif(ai) dai
)
+ bΠu
∫ a¯
0
f(ai)dai + g − c(b). (B.2)
The IPA choose (τk, τu, b) to maximise eq. (B.2)26. For any possible choice of b, the maxi-
mization problem in the variables τk and τu is the same of Section 3 so the optimal individual
transfers are given by:
τu = g − c(b) +
(
1− F
(
Πub
Πk
))
bU (B.3)
τk = g − c(b)− F
(
Πub
Πk
)
bU (B.4)
and then, again as in Section 3, the level of ability that discriminates between entrepreneurs
investing in the known or in the unknown sector is:
a¯∗ =
Πub
Πk
. (B.5)
It follows that welfare maximization becomes a one-dimensional problem. Hence, using (B.5),
(B.2) it can be rewritten as:
Πk
∫ 1
Πu
Πk
b
af(a) da+ Πu
∫ Πu
Πk
b
0
bf(a) da+ g − c(b). (B.6)
By maximizing (B.6), we find that b ∈ (0, 1) is a critical point if and only if
ΠuF
(
Πu
Πk
b
)
= c′(b). (B.7)
Observe that since c′(0) > 0 (i.e. the cost of improving IPA quality is increasing in the
quality), the optimal IP always requires b > 0.27
As in the case of exogenous b, our next step is to compare the social optimal allocation
chosen by the IPA with a “neutral” benchmark. In this context, to be consistent with our
previous analysis, we consider as a benchmark the neutral policy case, i.e. a situation where the
level of b is exogenously fixed and τu = τk =
G−c(b)
M . From equation B.7, it immediately follows
that:
Proposition B.1. Aggregate welfare under optimal IP is always larger than under the neutral
policy.
B.1 IP and entrepreneurs’ quality (Section 4.2.1)
Comparing populations of entrepreneurs with different average ability levels
In this paragraph we show how to derive the results of the paragraph IP, welfare and average
ability in Section 4.2.1. As in that section we assume that the cost function for the IPA is
quadratic of the form:
c(b) =
1
2
Λb2. (B.8)
We consider the same family of cumulative distributions we used in the Section 3.2:
Fγ(a) = a
γ
26In the following, we assume that G is large enough to allow for interior maxima of τk and τu (both
strictly positive).
27If b = 0 was optimal, it would satisfy (B.7) and on the left side of the equation we would have
ΠuF (0) = 0.
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for γ ∈ (0, 1). Finally, we make a technical assumption to ensure an internal maximum, namely:
Λ >
Π2u
Πk
. (B.9)
Under these assumptions, the model can be analytically solved. The results are illustrated
in the following proposition. They are used in the numerical study of Section 4.2.
Proposition B.2. The optimal IP is characterized by the following triple:
bγ =
(
Πγ+1u
ΠγkΛ
) 1
1−γ
τu,γ = g − 12Λ
(
Πγ+1u
ΠγkΛ
) 2
1−γ
+
1− F
Πu
(
Π
γ+1
u
Π
γ
k
Λ
) 1
1−γ
Πk

(Πγ+1uΠγkΛ ) 11−γ U
τk,γ = g − 12Λ
(
Πγ+1u
ΠγkΛ
) 2
1−γ − F
Πu
(
Π
γ+1
u
Π
γ
k
Λ
) 1
1−γ
Πk
(Πγ+1uΠγkΛ ) 11−γ U.
The corresponding per-capita welfare level is given by:
ω = Πk
γ
γ + 1
(
1−
(
Π2u
ΠkΛ
) γ+1
1−γ
)
+ Πu
(
Πγ+1u
ΠγkΛ
) 1
1−γ ( Π2u
ΠkΛ
) γ
1−γ
+ g.
Proof. For the specific case considered here, (B.7) becomes
Πu
(
Πu
Πk
b
)γ
= Λb.
There exists a unique strictly positive solution bγ of such an expression and, thanks to (B.9), it
belongs to (0, 1). It is given by
bγ =
(
Πγ+1u
ΠγkΛ
) 1
1−γ
.
Using standard arguments, it can be easily verified that such a critical point, whenever interior
(as in the simulation we present), is in fact a maximum. The corresponding value of a¯∗, found
using (B.5), denoted with a¯γ , is given by
a¯γ =
(
Π2u
ΠkΛ
) 1
1−γ
.
To find the corresponding values of τk and τu one has only to use (B.3). The explicit expression
of the net welfare is obtained using the previous values in the expression of the welfare:
ω = Πk
∫
a≥a¯∗
af(a) da+ Πu
∫
a<a¯∗
bf(a) da+ g − 1
2
Λb2
= Πk
∫ 1(
Π2u
ΠkΛ
) 1
1−γ aγa
γ−1 da
+ Πu
∫ ( Π2u
ΠkΛ
) 1
1−γ
0
(
Πγ+1u
ΠγkΛ
) 1
1−γ
γaγ−1 da+ g − 1
2
Λ
(
Πγ+1u
ΠγkΛ
) 2
1−γ
= Πk
γ
γ + 1
(
1−
(
Π2u
ΠkΛ
) γ+1
1−γ
)
+ Πu
(
Πγ+1u
ΠγkΛ
) 1
1−γ ( Π2u
ΠkΛ
) γ
1−γ
+ g. (B.10)
This concludes the proof.
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IP, welfare and inequality In this paragraph we show how to derive the results of the
paragraph IP, welfare and inequality levels in the ability distribution in Section 4.2.1. As men-
tioned in Section 4.2.1 we use in this case the same cumulative distribution function introduced
in (18) and we specify the cost function c(b) as in (B.8). The optimum triple (bα, τk,α, τu,α) can
be then explicitly characterized as shown in the following proposition. This result is used in the
numerical study of Section 4.2.
Proposition B.3. The optimal IP is characterised by the following triples (bα, τk,α, τu,α):
bα =
Πk
Πu
a¯α
τu,α = g − 12Λ
(
Πk
Πu
a¯α
)2
+ (1− F (a¯α)) ΠkΠu a¯αU
τk,α = g − 12Λ
(
Πk
Πu
a¯α
)2
− F (a¯α) ΠkΠu a¯αU.
where
a¯α =
3
2α−
√
9
4α
2 − 4α
(
α
2 + 1− Λ ΠkΠ2u
)
2α
.
Proof. In this case, (B.7) specifies as
ΠuF
(
Πu
Πk
b
)
=
Π2u
Πk
b
(
α
(
Πu
Πk
b− 1/2
)(
Πu
Πk
b− 1
)
+ 1
)
= Λb
that can be solved for a¯∗ = ΠuΠk b obtaining
a¯∗ =
3
2α±
√
9
4α
2 − 4α
(
α
2 + 1− Λ ΠkΠ2u
)
2α
.
By standard arguments one can easily see that the solution
a¯∗ =
3
2α−
√
9
4α
2 − 4α
(
α
2 + 1− Λ ΠkΠ2u
)
2α
.
if interior, is a maximum point of the welfare. Give such a a¯∗ we can find the explicit formulas
for τu and τk using (B.3) and (B.4).
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